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No Exit, No End: Probation in Rhode 
Island 
Lara Montecalvo, Kara Maguire, and Angela Yingling*† 
Imagine you are a criminal defense lawyer practicing in 
Rhode Island.  One day you receive a call from a frantic 
 
* Attorneys in the Appellate Division of the Rhode Island Public Defender.  
We are extremely grateful to Olin Thompson, Timothy Baldwin, and our 
colleagues at the Rhode Island Public Defender’s Office for their invaluable 
comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this Article.  We are also 
indebted to the staff at the Roger Williams University Law Review for their 
editorial assistance. 
† Inspired by the March 2015 Symposium Sounding the Alarm on Mass 
Incarceration: Moving Beyond the Problem and Toward Solutions 
(“Symposium”) at Roger Williams University School of Law, this Article was 
drafted in August and early September of 2015.  At the same time, Governor 
Gina Raimondo’s Justice Reinvestment Working Group was beginning to 
work on several proposals to alter the state of probation and incarceration in 
Rhode Island.  See Press Release, R.I. Office of the Governor, Raimondo 
Launches Working Group to Improve Criminal Justice System, Reduce Costs 
(July 7, 2015), available at http://www.ri.gov/press/view/25229.  Recently, we 
have begun to see the results of the group’s efforts: The same week this 
Article was submitted for publication, a majority of justices on the Rhode 
Island Superior Court proposed a series of amendments to the rules that 
address some of the concerns discussed herein.  See Order Soliciting 
Comments on Proposed Amendments to the Rhode Island Superior Court 
Rules of Criminal Procedure and Superior Court Sentencing Benchmarks 
(Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.courts.ri.gov/Courts/SupremeCourt/Supreme 
MiscOrders/Order-ProposedAmendmentsSuperiorCourtRulesofCriminal 
Procedure-SentencingBenchmarks3-16-16.pdf.  We are hopeful that the 
efforts of the working group, the courts, and others will continue to improve 
the criminal justice landscape in Rhode Island and render obsolete some of 
the observations made in this Article.  The same may be true of our 
references to other states’ practices because this area of law is rapidly 
evolving as the states explore ways to encourage rehabilitation while limiting 
the cost of corrections. 
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woman, “Ana.”  She is eight months pregnant and her 
twenty-five-year-old husband, “Dennis,” has been arrested 
on a misdemeanor charge of simple assault after an 
incident at a local bar.  Ana tells you that Dennis is 
currently being held without bail at the state’s jail facility, 
and that his next court date is not for two weeks.  He has a 
decent job at a local carpet installation company, she 
explains, but he is in danger of losing it if he misses too 
many days of work.1 
At first, this scenario might seem to be implausible; after all, 
the Rhode Island State Constitution requires that every person 
arrested on a misdemeanor charge be afforded reasonable bail.2  
However, in her distress, Ana forgot to mention one important 
fact: At the time Dennis was arrested, he was also serving a one-
year probationary sentence for a previous charge.3  As a result, 
when Dennis was brought to court the day after the bar fight, he 
was not only arraigned on the simple assault charge, but he was 
also presented with a notice of the state’s intention to revoke his 
probation based on the new allegations.4 
 
 1.  “Dennis’s” case is modeled on the real-world experiences of criminal 
defense practitioners in Rhode Island.  While this example is based on actual 
cases, the names and details have been altered for the purposes of this 
Article. 
 2.  See R.I. CONST. art. I, § 9. 
 3.  Ten months earlier, after a friend’s house party had grown a little 
too out-of-control, Dennis had unwisely confronted one of the officers 
summoned to break up the revelry; minutes later, he found himself charged 
with resisting arrest and disorderly conduct.  After spending the night at the 
local police station, Dennis appeared in the District Court the following 
morning for arraignment on his misdemeanor charges.  Knowing that he had 
been a little intoxicated the previous night, and that the complaining witness 
was a police officer, Dennis had accepted the judge’s offer to plead nolo 
contendere to the resisting arrest charge in exchange for a one-year 
probationary sentence and the dismissal of the disorderly conduct charge.  It 
had seemed like a good deal at the time, so Dennis decided to resolve his case 
on the spot, without consulting an attorney.  Dennis’s entire exchange with 
the judge took less than ten minutes. 
 4.  Pursuant to Rule 32(f) of the Rhode Island District Court Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, the state must provide the probationer with notice of its 
intention to seek the revocation of their probation.  R.I. DIST. CT. R. CRIM. P. 
32(f).  This document, informally referred to as a “32(f) petition,” is often 
presented to the defendant on the same day they are arraigned on a new 
criminal charge.   
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INTRODUCTION 
No defense attorney will deny that probation is a valuable 
part of the criminal justice system.  When used appropriately, it 
provides a cost-effective alternative to incarceration and permits 
lower-risk individuals to remain in the community under certain 
stated conditions.  However, in Rhode Island, where defendants 
are often placed on disproportionately long terms of supervision, 
the probationary system has ballooned into a resource-draining 
behemoth.5  Unfortunately, the system’s growth in size has not 
been matched by an increase in efficacy; too often, the inequitable 
structure of the probation revocation process results in the over-
incarceration of probationers, frequently for minor transgressions 
or even specious allegations.6 
This Article begins in Part I with an overview of Rhode 
Island’s probation violation system viewed through the lens of a 
criminal defense attorney advising a specific client, “Dennis,” and 
highlights many of the problems associated with the state’s 
probation violation paradigm.  In Part II, the focus moves from the 
practitioner to the law governing probation violations in Rhode 
Island and elsewhere.  In Section II.A, the extremely low 
standards of legal and factual proof employed in probation 
violation hearings in Rhode Island are dissected and the potential 
for modifying those standards is discussed.  Section II.B contains 
suggestions for reforms of probation violation law, including 
modifying the legal and factual standards of proof.  In Section 
II.C, two rule-based changes that might efficiently reduce the 
number of unnecessarily lengthy probationary sentences in this 
state are examined. 
I. YOUR CLIENT ON PROBATION 
To those unfamiliar with the criminal justice system, the idea 
of accepting a prison sentence based on false or unsupported 
allegations is simply unthinkable; after all, why would anyone 
 
 5.  See John Hill, Expert: Rhode Island’s Outdated Probation System 
Needs Overhaul, PROVIDENCE J. (Oct. 27, 2015, 11:15 PM), http://www. 
providencejournal.com/article/20151027/NEWS/151029335. 
 6.  See CAITLIN O’CONNOR & DANIELLE BARRON, R.I. DEP’T OF CORR., 
RIDOC HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 19 (2015) [hereinafter RIDOC HISTORICAL 
OVERVIEW], http://www.doc.ri.gov/docs/RIDOC%20Historical%20Overview.  
pdf. 
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ever plead guilty to a crime they did not commit?  However, any 
seasoned defense attorney practicing in Rhode Island—having 
asked numerous clients about their prior records—has had this 
conversation before: 
“So you have two prior convictions for breaking and 
entering?” 
“Yes, well, I was guilty the first time.  The second one, I 
didn’t do.” 
“Well, it says right here that you admitted to the second as 
well.  Why?” 
“I had to; I was on probation.” 
Although succinct, this answer is deceivingly complicated.  
Indeed, to fully understand how probation—a supposed 
alternative to incarceration—can ultimately lead to unjust 
imprisonment, one must start at the very beginning of the typical 
revocation process: the arrest and presentment of the violation 
notice. 
A. Go Directly to Jail; Do Not Pass Go 
Let’s return to Dennis.  As Ana told you, he was held without 
bail at his presentment—i.e., the first day he appeared in court. 
At Dennis’s presentment hearing—a proceeding akin in both 
length and depth to an arraignment on a criminal charge—the 
court had the choice to release him on his own recognizance, set 
surety bail, or hold him without bail.7  In practice, the decision to 
grant or withhold bail in these cases is often made on the basis of 
cursory and one-sided evidence.8  This initial proceeding, in our 
experience, typically involves little more than a mere recitation of 
the allegations by the prosecuting officer.  In most of these cases, 
the accused has not yet consulted with an attorney or, if they have 
done so, it had only been for a few brief moments. 
 
 7.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-14 (2006) (“The court . . . pending receipt 
of [the probationary authority’s written report on defendant’s conduct], may 
order the defendant held without bail . . . .” (emphasis added)); R.I. SUPER. 
CT. R. CRIM. P. 32(f) (“The defendant may be admitted to bail pending [a 
probation revocation] hearing.”). 
 8.  Cf. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-9; State v. Vashey, 823 A.2d 1151, 1155 
(R.I. 2003) (defendants facing probation violation allegation have no right to 
preliminary hearing to determine probable cause). 
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Despite the fact that both the Rhode Island General Laws and 
the District and Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure 
establish a presumption of bail in violation proceedings,9 in our 
experience, only a small number of alleged violators are released 
pending a hearing.  Rather, most defendants, like Dennis, are 
denied bail throughout the duration of their case on the basis of a 
five-minute court appearance.10  While the presentment is not 
intended to be a full hearing, the severity of the consequences—
near-certain detention for a minimum of two weeks—is vastly 
disproportional to the amount of scrutiny that the allegations are 
given at this proceeding. 
Recent statistics reveal that the average pretrial/prehearing 
detention in Rhode Island is twenty-three days in length, with 
fifteen percent of alleged offenders remaining on pretrial status 
after thirty days.11  This presents a significant problem for these 
probationers: How many people can just—without notice—walk 
away from their life for twenty-three days without suffering major 
consequences to their jobs, housing situations, and families?  Too 
often, as the probationer sits in jail, his or her life on the outside 
begins to crumble.  Criminal defense attorneys witness this 
phenomenon all of the time, and can offer little comfort to their 
incarcerated clients or their families.  After all, most employers 
are understandably not sympathetic about an unplanned weeks-
long absence from work, causing many probationers to lose jobs 
that were difficult to obtain in the first place.  Similarly, many 
probationers and their families lose their housing as a result of 
this detention12 because it is difficult, if not impossible, to pay 
 
 9.  R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-19-9, -14; R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 32(f); R.I. 
DIST. CT. R. CRIM. P. 32(f); see also R.I. DIST. CT. R. CRIM. P. 46(i); R.I. SUPER. 
CT. R. CRIM. P. 46(i).  
 10.  Recently, spurred on in part by the Symposium, some public 
defenders in Rhode Island have begun to advocate more vociferously for bail 
to be set in certain probation violation cases.  As of the drafting of this Article 
in September of 2015, the authors can report anecdotally that a few Superior 
Court justices have been responsive, releasing more alleged violators on bail 
in appropriate circumstances.  However, the vast majority of alleged violators 
are still held without bail pending a hearing.   
 11.  R.I. DEP’T OF CORR., FISCAL YEAR 2014 ANNUAL POPULATION REPORT 
13 (2014), http://www.doc.ri.gov/docs/FY14%20Annual%20Report%2010-
9.pdf. 
 12.  In our practice representing defendants in both District and Superior 
Courts, we have observed our clients lose their housing as a result of 
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rent and bills from behind bars.  Additionally, alleged violators 
must scramble for emergency care for children, elderly family 
members, and even pets.  In many cases, the alleged violation is 
trivial—a misdemeanor, perhaps, or a minor drug charge, or even 
just a “technical violation,” i.e., no new charge at all—and these 
collateral consequences can cause the probationer to suffer 
disproportionally to the nature of the allegation.13 
The immediate, nearly ubiquitous detention of alleged 
violators puts probationers in a precarious position.  As each day 
passes, the consequences of continued incarceration grow more 
severe for the accused and their families: bills accrue, jobs are lost, 
emergency childcare providers grow weary.  The state’s leverage 
over the defendant increases, incentivizing the defendant to enter 
into a plea deal—on the violation as well as the underlying 
charge—regardless of the weaknesses of the allegations.  This 
widespread detention of alleged violators becomes even more 
problematic when it is combined with the diminished level of due 
process guarantees afforded to individuals at the actual violation 
hearing. 
B. The Violation Hearing: The Presumption of Guilt 
At the next court date, you meet with Dennis in one of the 
tiny, cinderblock attorney rooms in the courthouse 
cellblock.  It is two weeks later, the day of the hearing, and 
it has been three days since your last visit with Dennis at 
the prison.  A thick pane of glass muffles your 
conversation, so you lean down to speak through the small 
screen located at the bottom of the window.  First, you 
 
relatively short periods of detention.  This phenomenon has been documented 
in the mainstream press; a recent article about the bail system in New York 
City found that “[d]isappearing into the machinery of the justice system [by 
failing to make bail] separates family members, interrupts work and 
jeopardizes housing.”  Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES: MAG. (Aug. 13, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/magazine/the-bail-trap.html.  
 13.  Remember, too, that these detainees are only accused violators; the 
immediate detention upends the lives of the innocent as well as the guilty.  In 
some cases, violation reports are withdrawn as the evidence wilts under later 
scrutiny or upon further investigation.  However, due to the mass prehearing 
detention of accused violators, any such vindication often comes at a steep 
price: The probationer may walk out of jail, but they might do so as homeless, 
jobless, or both.   
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update Dennis with the good news: You have been able to 
track down one of the other patrons at the bar on the night 
of his arrest.  This woman, “Sara,” is willing to testify that 
the complaining witness, “John,” had assaulted Dennis 
over a spilled drink and some angry words, and that 
Dennis’s participation in the fight had only been in self-
defense.  Dennis breaks into an excited smile at your 
words, but it quickly fades from his face as you continue, 
reminding him of the bad news:  Like all accused 
violators, his fate will be determined by a judge via a 
probation violation hearing—a David-versus-Goliath-style 
proceeding where the state’s standard of proof is 
frighteningly low, the rules of evidence are loosely applied, 
and the defendant’s confrontational rights are severely 
constrained. 
Even though an individual’s freedom—his or her most 
fundamental liberty interest—is at stake at a probation violation 
hearing, the alleged violator is afforded a mere sliver of the due 
process rights that form the bedrock of our criminal justice 
system.  While it has been long recognized that a probation 
revocation hearing is civil in nature, and thus not subject to the 
stricter rules enforced in a criminal trial,14 the overly-relaxed 
burden of proof and diminished evidentiary standards have all but 
transformed the violation hearing process into a mere formality.  
Many alleged violators put it another way: As soon as they put the 
handcuffs on me, I knew it was over. 
This oft-repeated refrain, familiar to the ears of any 
experienced criminal defense attorney, is technically incorrect—
only a judge or magistrate, after either a hearing or an admission, 
can adjudicate a person a probation violator and impose a 
sentence of imprisonment.15  But, to the man or woman sitting in 
 
 14.  The Rhode Island Supreme Court has stated that a probation-
violation hearing “is not part of a criminal prosecution, and, thus, does not 
call for the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a criminal 
proceeding.”  State v. Bourdeau, 448 A.2d 1247, 1248 (R.I. 1982). 
 15.  Pursuant to both statute and court rule, probationers are entitled to 
an evidentiary hearing to determine whether they have violated the 
conditions of their probation.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-9 (2006); R.I. SUPER. CT. 
R. CRIM. P. 32(f).  If the court, after such a hearing, determines that a 
violation has occurred, it may either continue the probationary term or 
sentence the probationer to a period of imprisonment.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-
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one of the cramped cells of Rhode Island’s Adult Correctional 
Institutions, this distinction is a matter of mere semantics.  As 
both defense attorneys and probationers know far too well, an 
incarceration sentence often becomes a fait accompli upon a 
probationer’s arrest.  This is due in large part to three factors: (1) 
the relaxed application of the rules of evidence and constitutional 
principles in violation hearings; (2) the exceedingly low and vague 
standard of proof employed in these hearings; and (3) the near 
absolute sentencing discretion granted to the hearing justice.16  
Combined, these factors result in very few defendants willing to 
take the risk and fight for their freedom at a hearing. 
While a criminal trial functions as the ultimate crucible, 
where evidence is both scrutinized under a set of strict rules and 
forced to endure the fiery test of cross-examination, the violation 
hearing, in contrast, is a much less exacting process.  Hearsay 
 
19-9.  In cases where the defendant is serving a “straight” probationary 
sentence—one without a concomitant suspended sentence—the court may 
currently impose a prison sentence of any length after a violation hearing, 
provided that the sentence does not exceed the maximum statutory penalty 
for the original charge.  Id.  In cases where the violator’s probation is 
accompanied by a suspended sentence, the court can either: (1) impose the 
entire suspended sentence, (2) impose a portion of the suspended sentence, or 
(3) continue the suspension of the entire sentence.  Id. 
 16.  The state is also permitted to use illegally obtained evidence to prove 
a violation, except where police actions are intended to harass, or where such 
actions “shock the conscience” of the court—circumstances which, to the 
authors’ knowledge, have never been found in Rhode Island.  See State v. 
Spratt, 386 A.2d 1094, 1095 n.2 (R.I. 1978).  The rationale for not applying 
the exclusionary rule to constitutional violations was that “it would be 
unrealistic to believe that a police officer will be further deterred from 
engaging in an unlawful search by the knowledge that his conduct will render 
the illegally obtained evidence inadmissible not only at a criminal trial but 
also at a revocation hearing.”  Id. at 1095.  Given the current legal landscape 
in Rhode Island, where the threat of revocation often accompanies—and 
sometimes supplants—criminal prosecution, there is good reason to question 
whether the lack of the exclusionary rule in violation hearings is, in fact, 
serving as an incentive for police to ignore the Fourth Amendment of the 
Constitution, especially when dealing with young, black residents in high-
crime neighborhoods.  See RIDOC HISTORICAL OVERVIEW, supra note 6, at 29 
(noting that one in six black male Rhode Islanders over the age of eighteen 
are under community corrections supervision); R.I. DEP’T OF CORR., ADULT 
PROB. & PAROLE, RI PROBATION AND PAROLE OFFENDERS LIVING IN RI 
COMMUNITIES AS OF 12-31-14, at 6 (2015), http://www.doc.ri.gov/ 
docs/PP%20city-gender%20data%2012-31-14-expanded%20age%202.pdf 
(noting that one in ten men between the ages of twenty-five and twenty-nine 
that live in the 02909 ZIP code are on probation or parole).  
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evidence is admissible upon a showing of “good cause,” even when 
it implicates a defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation.17  
Thus, a defendant does not always have the opportunity to have 
his or her accuser testify to the allegations in person, under oath, 
and in a courtroom; in many cases, a responding police officer can 
recite the complaining witness’s claims, often based on the officer’s 
memory or a brief report.18  The analysis employed in Crawford v. 
Washington, which strictly limits the admissibility of “testimonial” 
statements without the unavailability of the witness and a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination,19 has been held to be 
inapplicable to probation violation proceedings.20  In practice, this 
curtailment of the confrontation right presents the state with an 
incentive to introduce its evidence through the sanitized 
testimony of these professional witnesses instead of the less 
predictable, but first-hand, accounts of civilian eyewitnesses or 
complainants. 
These relaxed rules of evidence become even more troubling 
when combined with Rhode Island’s shockingly low standard of 
proof at a probation violation hearing.  Rhode Island is one of the 
few states that allows the hearing justice to find against a 
probationer as long as the evidence “reasonably satisfies” her that 
a violation has occurred.21  This standard raises an important 
question—what does it take to “reasonably satisfy” the court?  
Furthermore, the judge does not need to find that the probationer 
actually committed a crime or broke a specific condition of 
probation in order to impose a prison sentence; she must merely 
 
 17.  State v. Bernard, 925 A.2d 936, 939 (R.I. 2007) (citing State v. 
DeRoche, 389 A.2d 1229, 1234 (R.I. 1978)). 
 18.  See, e.g., State v. Pompey, 934 A.2d 210, 213 (R.I. 2007).   
 19.  541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). 
 20.  Pompey, 934 A.2d at 214. 
 21.  See State v. Gibson, 126 A.3d 427, 431 (R.I. 2015) (quoting State v. 
Hazard, 68 A.3d 479, 499 (R.I. 2013)).  Recently, however, a majority of 
justices of the Rhode Island Superior Court have proposed raising the legal 
standard of proof at a violation hearing, which would require the state to 
prove an alleged violation by a “fair preponderance of the evidence.”  See 
Order Soliciting Comments on Proposed Amendments to the Rhode Island 
Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure and Superior Court Sentencing 
Benchmarks (Mar. 16, 2016) [hereinafter Order Soliciting Comments on 
Proposed Amendments], https://www.courts.ri.gov/Courts/SupremeCourt/ 
SupremeMiscOrders/Order-ProposedAmendmentsSuperiorCourtRulesof 
CriminalProcedureSentencingBenchmarks3-16-16.pdf. 
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be satisfied that the defendant “failed to keep the peace and to 
remain on good behavior” on the day in question.22  The reality is 
that this standard is as low as it is vague, leaving attorneys and 
defendants uncertain of both the type and quantum of proof 
necessary to sustain a finding of violation. 
Given this probation violation landscape, prevailing at a 
violation hearing is a Herculean task, even for the innocent.  As a 
result, a defendant facing flimsy or questionable allegations is 
often left to one of two unfortunate fates.  First, if she elects to go 
to a hearing, she has a good chance of losing on extremely weak, 
unreliable, or even unsupported evidence, and facing years—if not 
decades—of imprisonment as a result, even if the criminal charges 
are later dismissed or amended.23  This phenomenon—often 
referred to as the “proxy trial” problem—allows the state to 
“supplant[] the use of the more rigorous trial proceeding, and in 
effect create[] a criminal conviction where one might not otherwise 
be available.”24  This is especially true in Rhode Island, where a 
hearing justice may consider the “totality of the circumstances” 
when determining what sentence to impose after a violation 
hearing,25 and has wide discretion in fashioning the imprisonment 
sentence.26  Thus, a hearing justice can take the new allegations 
into consideration when shaping a violation sentence, even if 
liability for that conduct has not been established through the 
 
 22.  State v. Gautier, 774 A.2d 882, 887 (R.I. 2001) (quoting State v. 
Znosko, 755 A.2d 832, 835 (R.I. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 23.  See Andrew Horwitz, The Costs of Abusing Probationary Sentences: 
Overincarceration and the Erosion of Due Process, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 753, 
766, 771 (2010).   
 24.  Daniel F. Piar, A Uniform Code of Procedure for Revoking Probation, 
31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 117, 119–20 (2003); see also AM. BAR ASS’N PROJECT ON 
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PROBATION § 5.3 
cmt., at 63 (1970); Horwitz, supra note 23, at 785.   
 25.  State v. Wisehart, 569 A.2d 434, 437 (R.I. 1990).  
 26.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-9 (2006).  It is important to note, 
however, that a majority of the Rhode Island Superior Court justices have 
recently attempted to create more uniformity in violation sentences via a 
proposed amendment to the Superior Court Sentencing Benchmarks.  See 
Order Soliciting Comments on Proposed Amendments, supra note 21, at 4.  
The proposed change would require a Superior Court justice to consider the 
sentencing benchmark ranges for the original offense when imposing a 
violation sentence, and would allow departure from the benchmarks only 
“when substantial and compelling circumstances exist.”  Id. at 3–4. 
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rigorous criminal prosecution process.27 
In the second group of cases, alleged violators, knowing they 
are facing near-impossible odds at a hearing, decide to admit to 
the false or unsubstantiated allegations in exchange for a shorter 
sentence.  As criminal defense attorneys practicing in Rhode 
Island can confirm, a probationer charged with a new criminal 
offense is often offered a sentencing incentive to resolve both the 
new charge and the violation at the same time.28  Usually, this 
deal includes a defined violation sentence (lower than the 
maximum term the defendant could face after a violation hearing), 
conditioned on a nolo contendere plea to the related misdemeanor 
or felony charge.29  In District Court, where the violation hearing 
and criminal trial are usually scheduled for the same day, the 
probationer often is given a choice of either resolving both cases 
with an admission of guilt, or proceeding to both a bench trial and 
the violation hearing that very day.30  In Superior Court, where 
the violation hearing is usually scheduled long before the criminal 
charge is reached for trial, the defendant must often choose either 
an immediate violation hearing or an accelerated, combined plea 
disposition on both the violation and criminal charge(s).31  If used 
 
 27.  This was not always the case: in State v. Wisehart, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court substantially limited prior caselaw that prevented the 
hearing justice from considering the new allegations when determining an 
appropriate violation sentence.  See 569 A.2d at 436–37 (finding that 
evidence of criminal conduct or bad behavior adduced at a hearing can be 
taken into account at sentencing because it gives the sentencing justice 
insight into the probationer’s “amenability to rehabilitation”).  
 28.  See COUNCIL ST. GOV’TS: JUST. CTR., RHODE ISLAND JUSTICE 
REINVESTMENT WORKING GROUP: THIRD MEETING 14, 21 (Oct. 27, 2015) 
[hereinafter THIRD MEETING], https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2015/11/RhodeIslandWorkingGroup3.pdf.  
 29.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-19-8, -9, -19. 
 30.  In all misdemeanor cases, Rhode Island criminal defendants have a 
right to a jury trial in the first instance.  State v. Holliday, 280 A.2d 333, 338 
(R.I. 1971); R.I. DIST. CT. R. CRIM. P. 23. However, a criminal defendant may 
also elect to have the case first heard in the District Court, and, if he is 
aggrieved by the judge’s decision in a criminal case, he is then entitled to a de 
novo jury trial in the Superior Court on the misdemeanor charge itself (but 
not the adjudication of violation).  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-22-1; R.I. DIST. CT. R. 
CRIM. P. 23; State v. Avila, 415 A.2d 180, 182 (R.I. 1980) (citing State v. Gill, 
342 A.2d 256, 257 (R.I. 1975)).   
 31.  If the defendant expresses a reluctance to resolve the new case at the 
time of their violation hearing in Superior Court, the court will often offer a 
third choice, the so-called “violation-only offer.”  This allows the defendant to 
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correctly, this practice—commonly referred to as “wrapping” the 
new charge in with the violation allegation32—provides both the 
state and the defendant with the ability to efficiently resolve 
several matters on mutually acceptable terms.  Wrapping the 
cases is especially useful when the new charge is based on 
substantial evidence that would likely allow the state to secure a 
guilty verdict after trial.  However, because the violation offer is 
often conditioned on the defendant’s admission to the criminal 
offense, this process also permits the state to secure a conviction 
in cases where the evidence is weak or unsupported.33 
Back in the courthouse cellblock on the day of the 
probation-violation hearing, two weeks after Dennis was 
initially held, you explain to him that, at a trial, he would 
be allowed to present an absolute defense to the charge of 
simple assault, based on his claim of self-defense.  The 
evidence against him, the complainant John’s testimony, 
can be contradicted by Sara’s testimony.  The state’s other 
civilian witness, John’s friend “Nick,” who was with him 
at the bar that night, has moved to California and will not 
return to testify in the case.  Thus, Nick’s damaging 
statement to the police cannot come into evidence at a 
trial, as it is hearsay and its admission would violate the 
confrontation principles outlined in Crawford.34  You 
explain to Dennis that, even if he loses his first trial before 
the District Court judge, he has a right to appeal the case 
to the Superior Court for a full jury trial where he can 
present his case to a jury of his peers.35  At the jury trial, 
 
admit violation and receive an agreed-upon term of imprisonment on the 
probation case alone.  In a situation like this, the new charge would proceed 
independently of the violation.  This practice is rarely used in the District 
Court.  In the Superior Court, sometimes—although not always—the term of 
imprisonment included in the “violation-only offer” is either equal to or 
greater than the one included with the wrap offer.  This leverage technique is 
not universally employed, but it is all-too-frequently witnessed by the 
criminal practitioners who handle violation cases with regularity.  See 
Horwitz, supra note 23, at 766.   
 32.  See, e.g., THIRD MEETING, supra note 28, at 21 (“Half of those on 
probation are reconvicted/wrapped within three years.”).  
 33.  See Horwitz, supra note 23, at 766. 
 34.  See generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 35.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-22-1. 
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you tell him, each and every one of the jurors would have 
to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he 
assaulted John first, and not in self-defense, in order to 
find him guilty of misdemeanor assault. 
But, you warn, the violation hearing is a different matter.  
There is no appeal to a jury; there is only the judge.  You 
explain that the police officer, a trained and confident 
witness, will be allowed to testify to Nick’s inculpatory 
statement if the court finds there is “good cause” to admit 
this hearsay evidence.36  Even if Sara’s testimony gives the 
judge some doubt about the validity of John’s claim, the 
judge can still find Dennis to be a violator if she is 
reasonably satisfied that he was not of good behavior that 
night.37  After all, you remind Dennis, the judge does not 
have to find that he committed the assault in order to keep 
him in prison.38  While there is no evidence that Dennis 
was severely intoxicated that evening, you remind him 
that he had admitted to the responding officer that he 
“might have had one too many” in the bar.  Could this be 
considered bad behavior?  You cannot say for sure.  You 
also remind him that Sara will testify, and Dennis does 
not deny, that he and John were involved in a heated 
verbal argument before John threw the first punch.  Is this 
verbal sparring a failure to keep the peace and be of good 
behavior?  Dennis looks to you for answers, but you can 
only remind him that if he loses, then the judge can 
sentence him to up to one year of prison, the maximum 
sentence allowed on the original resisting arrest charge.39 
You then present him with the state’s offer: If Dennis 
 
 36.  State v. Bernard, 925 A.2d 936, 939 (R.I. 2007) (citing State v. 
DeRoche, 389 A.2d 1229, 1234 (1978)). 
 37.  See State v. Sylvia, 871 A.2d 954, 957 (R.I. 2005) (citing State v. 
Anderson, 705 A.2d 996, 997 (R.I. 1997)). 
 38.  See State v. Gautier, 774 A.2d 882, 887 (R.I. 2001) (“It is not the role 
of the hearing justice to determine the validity of the specific charge that 
formed the basis of the violation.”).   
 39.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-7-10(b) (allowing imprisonment for up to one 
year following a conviction for resisting arrest); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-9 
(“Upon a determination that the defendant has violated the terms and 
conditions of his or her probation the court . . . may . . . impose a sentence if 
one has not been previously imposed . . .”).  
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enters a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of simple 
assault, he will be placed on probation for an additional 
year, with the special condition that he enter counseling 
for alcohol treatment.  If he accepts that offer, the judge 
has agreed to sentence him to time served on the violation 
and release him from prison that day.  You warn him that 
if he takes this deal, however, he will not only face 
additional probation and required treatment, but he also 
will have two misdemeanor convictions on his record, 
making his criminal record now inexpungable under 
Rhode Island law.40  That means, you tell him, that no 
matter how many positive things he accomplishes in the 
future, these convictions will haunt him for the rest of his 
life. 
At first he protests—he did not assault anyone, he was just 
defending himself!  He does not want to plead guilty to the 
charge.  But then he closes his eyes and his shoulders sag.  
He tells you that he might be able to get his job back if he 
is released today; Ana has spoken to his boss, who has not 
replaced him yet but cannot wait much longer.  Ana is due 
to give birth in a few weeks; he knows he needs to be out to 
help her, and he does not want to miss the birth of his 
baby.  “What would you do?” he asks as he sighs and 
opens his eyes and tells you to prepare the paperwork. 
II.  RHODE ISLAND’S UNREASONABLY LOW PROBATION VIOLATION 
STANDARDS 
Most criminal defense attorneys have had clients like Dennis, 
maybe dozens or even hundreds of them.  As both lawyers and 
defendants are aware, the consequences of a probation revocation 
can be just as serious as another criminal conviction, with judges 
often doling out lengthy prison sentences after hearings.41  
Therefore, the extremely low standard of proof employed at these 
 
 40.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-1.3-2 (allowing only first offenders to file a 
motion for expungement).  
 41.  See, e.g., State v. Raso, 80 A.3d 33, 41 (R.I. 2013) (reviewing an 
adjudication in which a judge found the defendant to be a violator and 
sentenced him to serve twenty-five years of previously imposed suspended 
sentences).   
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hearings is a key component of Rhode Island’s imbalanced 
probation system, and as such, a natural starting point for reform. 
As discussed, a hearing judge is not tasked with finding, to a 
degree of reasonable satisfaction, whether the defendant 
committed the crime alleged, an undertaking that would require 
the finding of specific elements.  The question, rather, is whether 
the defendant “fail[ed] to keep the peace and remain on good 
behavior”42—an indefinite touchstone that leaves a probationer 
vulnerable to violation based on a wide variety of undefined non-
criminal behavior.43  In other words, a lack of evidence as to 
whether a probationer committed a specific crime may be 
compensated by evidence that he or she engaged in tangential, 
non-criminal—arguably “bad”—behavior.44  Thus, revocation 
turns on a question with not one, but two pliant variables, 
referred to in this Article as the “legal” burden of proof and the 
“factual” burden of proof, respectively: Is the hearing judge (1) 
reasonably satisfied (2) that the probationer failed to keep the 
 
 42.  State v. McCarthy, 945 A.2d 318, 326 (R.I. 2008) (citing State v. 
Forbes, 925 A.2d 929, 934 (R.I. 2007)). 
 43.  See, e.g., State v. Pitts, 960 A.2d 240, 242, 246 (R.I. 2008) 
(“Irrespective of whether [the defendant] could be found guilty of disorderly 
conduct, there was sufficient evidence for the hearing justice to conclude that 
he had violated his probation by failing to keep the peace and remain on good 
behavior . . .  [by] engag[ing] in a sexual act in a vehicle on a public highway, 
at a time when he was on probation for prior sex offenses.”).  Indeed, the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court has provided little in the way of guidance on 
what non-criminal behavior would not amount to a failure to keep the peace 
and be of good behavior.  See, e.g., McCarthy, 945 A.2d at 328 (avoiding issue 
of whether non-criminal possession of women’s underwear in coat liner or 
driving by the home of sex offender counselor amounted to a failure to keep 
the peace and be of good behavior).  But see id. at 329 n.9 (Flaherty, J., 
dissenting) (noting that although defendant’s possession of female 
undergarments as a twice-convicted sex offender was “downright disturbing,” 
it was “neither a violation of the law nor a breach of a condition of 
probation”).   
 44.  See, e.g., State v. Lamoureux, 58 A.3d 189, 193–94 (R.I. 2013) 
(affirming finding of violation based on evidence that defendant had placed 
“himself into unseemly and probably criminal activities within [twenty-four] 
hours of each other”; hearing justice did not have to determine whether 
defendant actually assaulted anyone (alteration in original)); State v. 
Gautier, 774 A.2d 882, 887 (R.I. 2001) (reversing a finding of no violation 
where there was evidence that defendant was present at the scene of the 
murder, failed to report the murder, and fled from a police officer; hearing 
justice was not required to find that defendant was guilty of murder). 
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peace and be of good behavior?45  When mapped against the 
national landscape, Rhode Island’s exceptionally discretionary 
standard is an outlier. 
In an effort to find guidance from other states, Section II.A 
provides a brief overview of the burdens of proof used at probation 
revocation hearings in other jurisdictions.  Section II.B examines 
potential avenues of reform to Rhode Island’s revocation 
standards, including a recently proposed amendment to Rule 32(f) 
of the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure 
that would increase the legal burden of proof to “fair 
preponderance of the evidence.”46 Section II.B also recommends 
replacing the current factual burden of proof, “keeping the peace 
and being of good behavior,” with a framework that allows for 
revocation only when a probationer commits a new crime or 
violates a specific condition of probation.  Section II.C discusses 
two pragmatic sentencing reforms that target Rhode Island’s 
disproportionately long probationary sentences: (1) a system of 
earned compliance credits for probationary periods (also referred 
to as good time credits), and (2)  probationary sentence limits for 
certain categories of crimes, a measure that has recently been 
proposed by a majority of current Rhode Island Superior Court 
Justices.47 
A. Legal Burdens of Proof Across the Country 
Notably, there is no constitutionally mandated burden of 
proof at a probation violation hearing.  While the United States 
Supreme Court has laid out minimum due process requirements 
for parole revocation hearings and probation revocation hearings 
in Morrissey v. Brewer and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, respectively, it 
has not mandated any standard of proof for such hearings.48  
 
 45.  See State v. Ditren, 126 A.3d 414, 418 (R.I. 2015) (citing State v. 
Delarosa, 39 A.3d 1043, 1049 (R.I. 2012)). 
 46.  See Order Soliciting Comments on Proposed Amendments, supra 
note 21, at 1.  
 47.  Id. at 4. 
 48.  411 U.S. 778, 781–82, 786 (1973) (probation revocation proceedings); 
408 U.S. 471, 482–89 (1972) (parole revocation proceedings).  Minimum due 
process requirements include: 
“(a) written notice of the claimed violations of [probation or] parole; 
(b) disclosure to the [probationer or] parolee of evidence against him; 
(c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and 
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However, its refusal to require the “full panoply of rights”49 
afforded to defendants in criminal proceedings implies that 
violations need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.50  In the 
absence of a clear constitutional direction, the states have formed 
a rough bell curve, with the majority of states using the middling 
“preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof employed in most 
civil cases, and the others adopting higher or lower standards.51  
These standards of proof, ordered from the lowest to highest 
burden, include Rhode Island’s “reasonable satisfaction”52 
standard on the extreme low end, followed by “preponderance of 
the evidence,”53 “clear and convincing evidence,”54 and, finally, the 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard55 topping the high end of 
the spectrum.56 
 
documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine 
adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good 
cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a ‘neutral and detached’ 
hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which 
need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement 
by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for 
revoking [probation or] parole.” 
Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786 (alterations in original) (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. 
at 489). 
 49.  Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480. 
 50.  See Piar, supra note 24, at 127 (“In neither Morrissey nor Gagnon . . . 
did the Court address what standard of proof should apply in this less-than-
criminal proceeding, thus leaving the matter to the states and their 
individual codes of procedure.”). 
 51.  Thirty-six states and the District of Columbia employ what amounts 
to a preponderance of the evidence standard for probation revocation 
hearings.  See infra text accompanying notes 65–66. 
 52.  See, e.g., State v. Ditren, 126 A.3d 414, 418 (R.I. 2015) (“[T]he state 
need only show that ‘reasonably satisfactory’ evidence supports a finding that 
the defendant has violated his or her probation.” (quoting State v. Delarosa, 
39 A.3d 1043, 1049 (R.I. 2012))). 
 53.  See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-32(d) (West 2012 & Supp. 2015) 
(“No such revocation shall be ordered, except upon consideration of the whole 
record and unless such violation is established by the introduction of reliable 
and probative evidence and by a preponderance of the evidence.”).   
 54.  See, e.g., MINN. R. CRIM. P. § 27.04 (allowing probationers a right to 
“a revocation hearing to determine whether clear and convincing evidence of 
a probation violation exists and whether probation should be revoked”). 
 55.  See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-206 (2013) (requiring proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt where the violation is a new criminal offense). 
 56.  South Carolina and Virginia do not have explicitly-stated burdens 
that easily fall into such categories.  In South Carolina, although there must 
be “sufficient evidence” establishing that the defendant violated probation, 
the courts have not made clear what quantum of evidence is “sufficient.”  See 
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While there is no case law defining exactly what “reasonable 
satisfaction” requires in Rhode Island, it is clear that it is not only 
less exacting than the beyond a reasonable doubt standard used in 
criminal prosecutions, but also lower than the preponderance of 
evidence standard employed in civil actions.57  Indeed, the burden 
is perhaps most akin to the burden of production of a defendant 
seeking an affirmative defense: namely, the burden to point to 
some evidence.58 
 
State v. Allen, 634 S.E.2d 653, 655 (S.C. 2006).  Similarly, in Virginia, “the 
court may revoke the suspension of sentence for any cause the court deems 
sufficient,” an evidentiary determination firmly within the discretion of the 
court.  VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-306(A) (2008); Marshall v. Commonwealth, 116 
S.E.2d 270, 273 (Va. 1960). 
 57.  Although a hearing judge must weigh evidence and assess 
credibility, “[t]he burden of proof in a probation-revocation hearing . . . is 
considerably lower than in a criminal case; the state is required to show only 
that defendant is a violator by reasonably satisfactory evidence.”  State v. 
Forbes, 925 A.2d 929, 934 (R.I. 2007) (emphasis added); see also State v. 
Sparks, 667 A.2d 1250, 1252 (R.I. 1995) (rejecting argument that a prior 
inconsistent statement was insufficient to support a finding of violation, and 
citing state’s argument that the “‘reasonably satisfied’ standard of a 
probation-revocation hearing allows an even more relaxed burden of proof 
than the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard required in a civil case”).  
One Superior Court justice has even suggested that “reasonable satisfaction” 
requires less proof than probable cause.  State v. Reis, No. P2-03-2726A, 2012 
WL 3638892, at *14 (R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2012) (“The same way the State 
does not need to prove a violation beyond a reasonable doubt, the State need 
not prove that there exists probable cause to determine a finding of 
violation.”). 
 58.  Compare State v. Bouffard, 945 A.2d 305, 310 (R.I. 2008) (“The 
burden of proof on the state at a probation violation hearing is much lower 
than that which exists in a criminal trial—the state need only show that 
‘reasonably satisfactory’ evidence supports a finding that the defendant 
violated his or her probation.”), with State v. Verrecchia, 766 A.2d 377, 387–
88 (R.I. 2001) (“A court assessing the sufficiency of the defendant’s 
presentation on this score (that is, whether ‘some evidence’ has been 
adduced) must be able to find more than a scintilla of support to justify such 
an instruction.”).  The standard is arguably so low that it only requires the 
state to produce evidence of violation, not to persuade the trier of fact.  As the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland put it: “We have great difficulty in 
conceptualizing how a reasonable satisfaction standard can meaningfully 
operate below the level of a preponderance of the evidence while the State 
would still bear the burden to produce evidence and the burden of 
persuasion.”  Wink v. State, 563 A.2d 414, 419 (Md. 1989) (emphasis added).  
Given the extremely deferential standard of review on appeal, it is difficult to 
determine whether, in practice, there is any amount of evidence that would 
be insufficient to support a finding.  See State v. English, 21 A.3d 403, 407 
(R.I. 2011) (stating that appellate review “is limited to considering whether 
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Only five other states utilize a burden of proof similar to 
Rhode Island’s: Alabama,59 Nevada,60 North Carolina,61 South 
Dakota,62 and Washington.63  Of course, none of these 
jurisdictions has revocation landscapes identical to that of Rhode 
Island, and other principles, not applicable in Rhode Island, help 
mitigate the effects of the low standard in other states.64 
Three other states—Delaware, Idaho, and Maryland—use a 
 
the hearing justice acted arbitrarily or capriciously in finding a violation” 
(quoting State v. Sylvia, 871 A.2d 954, 957 (R.I. 2005))).   
 59.   Sams v. State, 48 So. 3d 665, 669 (Ala. 2010) (“[T]he trial court need 
‘only be reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the probationer has 
violated the conditions of his probation.’” (quoting Ex parte J.J.D., 778 So. 2d 
240, 242 (Ala. 2000))). 
 60.  In Lewis v. State, the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed reasonable 
satisfaction as the appropriate standard of proof for a violation hearing.  529 
P.2d 796, 797 (Nev. 1974).  In Dail v. State, the petitioner asked, to no avail, 
that the court reject this standard in favor of adopting a preponderance of the 
evidence standard.  610 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Nev. 1980).   
 61.  State v. Hewett, 154 S.E.2d 476, 480 (N.C. 1967) (stating that the 
evidence must “be such as to reasonably satisfy the judge . . . that the 
defendant has willfully violated a valid condition of probation or that the 
defendant has violated without lawful excuse a valid condition upon which 
the sentence was suspended”); see also State v. Harris, 646 S.E.2d 526, 529 
(N.C. 2007).  
 62.  State v. Beck, 619 N.W.2d 247, 249 (S.D. 2000) (“All that is required 
is the evidence and facts be such as to reasonably satisfy the judge that the 
conduct of the probationer has not been as good as required by the conditions 
of probation.”).  
 63.  City of Aberdeen v. Regan, 239 P.3d 1102, 1104 (Wash. 2010) (“In 
order to revoke probation, ‘[a]ll that is required is that the evidence and facts 
be such as to reasonably satisfy the court that the probationer has breached a 
condition under which he was granted probation.’” (quoting Standlee v. 
Smith, 518 P.2d 721, 723 (Wash. 1974))). 
 64.  For example, in Alabama, “[i]t is well settled that hearsay evidence 
may not form the sole basis for revoking an individual’s probation.”  Goodgain 
v. State, 755 So. 2d 591, 592 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999); see also Clayton v. State, 
669 So. 2d 220, 222 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (“The use of hearsay as the sole 
means of proving a violation of a condition of probation denies a probationer 
the right to confront and to cross-examine the persons originating 
information that forms the basis of the revocation.”).  Additionally, in North 
Carolina, probation can be revoked only where the probationer (1) commits a 
new crime; (2) absconds supervision; or (3) violates a specific condition of 
probation after serving two periods of “confinement in response to violation” 
for committing technical violations.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1344(a) (2013); 
State v. Nolen, 743 S.E.2d 729, 730 & n.1 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013).  Unlike Rhode 
Island, probation in North Carolina cannot be revoked for something as 
vague as “fail[ing] to keep the peace and to remain on good behavior.”  State 
v. Gautier, 774 A.2d 882, 887 (R.I. 2001). 
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reasonable satisfaction standard, but apply it as preponderance of 
the evidence.65  Indeed, the preponderance of the evidence 
standard is far and away the most prevalent burden of proof, with 
thirty-three other states and the District of Columbia requiring it 
at revocation hearings—by statute, court procedural or 
evidentiary rule, or court decision.66  Two states, Minnesota and 
 
 65.  A leading case in Delaware, cited in most violation decisions in that 
state, echoed the Fifth Circuit in stating: 
A judge in [a probation revocation] proceeding need not have 
evidence that would establish beyond a reasonable doubt guilt of 
criminal offenses.  All that is required is that the evidence and facts 
be such as to reasonably satisfy the judge that the conduct of the 
probationer has not been as good as required by the conditions of 
probation.   
Brown v. State, 249 A.2d 269, 272 (Del. 1968) (quoting Manning v. United 
States, 161 F.2d 827, 829 (5th Cir. 1947)).  In more recent decisions, however, 
the reasonable satisfaction standard has been applied as a preponderance 
standard.  For example, in Weaver v. State, the court stated that “the trial 
court has broad authority to find a probation violation applying a 
preponderance of the evidence standard, in contrast to the standard of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt required for the initial conviction.”  779 A.2d 254, 
259 (Del. 2001).  In Idaho, although the state must provide “satisfactory 
proof” of a violation, the standard requires that the prosecution present 
“substantial evidence” of the violation, which suggests that a preponderance 
standard is actually required.  State v. Rose, 171 P.3d 253, 256 (Idaho 2007).  
Additionally, in Maryland, if the court is “reasonably satisfied by a 
preponderance of the evidence that a violation has occurred,” then the 
standard of proof has been met and probation may be revoked.  Gibson v. 
State, 616 A.2d 877, 879 (Md. 1992); accord Hammonds v. State, 80 A.3d 698, 
703–04 (Md. 2013); Baynard v. State, 569 A.2d 652, 655 (Md. 1990); Wink v. 
State, 563 A.2d 414, 415 (Md. 1989).  In other words, as applied in Maryland, 
the reasonable satisfaction standard is equivalent to the preponderance of 
the evidence standard.  Wink, 563 A.2d at 415; Robert B. v. State, 998 A.2d 
909, 919 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010). 
 66.  See ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 27.8(b)(3); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-93-308(d) 
(2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-32(d) (West 2012 & Supp. 2015); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 42-8-34.1(b) (2014); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-6-4(c) (2014); IND. CODE § 
35-38-2-3(f) (2012); ME. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 1206 (2006 & Supp. 2015); MICH. CT. 
R. 6.445(E)(1); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-203(6)(a) (2014); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. 
LAW § 410.70(3) (McKinney 2005 & Supp. 2016); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-
311(e)(1) (2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 302(a)(4) (2008 & Supp. 2015); WYO. 
R. CRIM. P. 39(a)(5); N.D. R. CRIM. P. 32(f)(3)(B); Holton v. State, 602 P.2d 
1228, 1238 (Alaska 1979); People v. Rodriguez, 795 P.2d 783, 785 (Cal. 1990); 
Harris v. United States, 612 A.2d 198, 203 (D.C. 1992); Russell v. State, 982 
So. 2d 642, 646 (Fla. 2008); Calvert v. State, 310 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Iowa 
1981); State v. Gumfory, 135 P.3d 1191, 1193 (Kan. 2006); Barker v. 
Commonwealth, 379 S.W.3d 116, 123 (Ky. 2012); Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 
841 N.E.2d 1240, 1246 (Mass. 2006); State v. Oliver, 856 So. 2d 328, 332 
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Nebraska, have split the difference between preponderance of the 
evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, adopting clear and 
convincing evidence as the burden of proof at revocation 
hearings.67  New Mexico also falls somewhere between 
preponderance of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, 
requiring a violation of probation to be proven with “reasonable 
certainty.”68 
Three states—Colorado, Hawaii, and Louisiana—go above 
what is constitutionally necessary, using a reasonable doubt 
standard, at least when the revocation is based on the alleged 
commission of a crime.69  For example, in Hawaii, legislation 
requires that probation “shall” be revoked upon conviction of a 
felony, and “may” be revoked upon conviction of a crime other 
than a felony.70  This scheme requires prosecutors to proceed on 
the underlying charge first, negating any “proxy trial” problem 
posed by revocation proceedings when the basis of the revocation 
is a new criminal charge.71  Similarly, in Louisiana, probation 
may be revoked upon a misdemeanor or felony conviction.72  
Lastly, Colorado has an explicit two-tier system.  When the 
violation alleged is a criminal act, the prosecution has the burden 
of establishing the violation beyond a reasonable doubt unless the 
 
(Miss. 2003); Turner v. State, 784 S.W.2d 342, 344 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); State 
v. Carlson, 767 A.2d 421, 426 (N.H. 2001); State v. Lavoy, 614 A.2d 1077, 
1080 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992); State v. Garner, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas 
No. 15-AP-06-003, 2016-Ohio-461, ¶ 3; Tilden v. State, 306 P.3d 554, 556 
(Okla. Crim. App. 2013); State v. Donovan, 751 P.2d 1109, 1110 (Or. 1988); 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 469 A.2d 1371, 1373 n.2 (Pa. 1983); Hacker v. 
State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 864–65 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Layton City v. 
Stevenson, 337 P.3d 242, 244 (Utah 2014); State v. Brown, 600 S.E.2d 561, 
564 (W. Va. 2004); State ex rel. Thompson v. Riveland, 326 N.W.2d 768, 771 
(Wis. 1982).  
 67.  MINN. R. CRIM. P. 27.04; NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2267 (Reissue 2008). 
 68.  See, e.g., State v. Guthrie, 257 P.3d 904, 909 (N.M. 2011); State v. 
Brusenhan, 438 P.2d 174, 176 (N.M. Ct. App. 1968). 
 69.  See COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-206(3) (2013); HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-
625(3) (2014) (requiring conviction if a new crime is the basis of a probation 
violation); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 901 (2005 & Supp. 2013) (same). 
 70.  HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-625(3) (“The court shall revoke probation if 
the defendant . . . has been convicted of a felony.  The court may revoke the 
suspension of sentence or probation if the defendant has been convicted of 
another crime other a felony.”). 
 71.  See Horwitz, supra note 23, at 784–88. 
 72.  LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 901. 
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defendant has already been convicted of the offense.73  When the 
violation alleged is a technical violation of a condition of probation 
rather than a criminal offense, the prosecution has the burden of 
establishing the violation by a preponderance of the evidence.74 
B. Modifying Rhode Island’s Legal and Factual Burden of Proof 
1. Legal Burden of Proof 
The proposed amendment to Rule 32(f) of the Superior Court 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, still pending at the time of this 
Article’s publication, provides that “[n]o revocation shall occur 
unless the State establishes by a fair preponderance of the 
evidence that the defendant breached a condition of his/her 
probation or deferred sentence or failed to keep the peace and or 
remain on good behavior.”75  If the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
approves this proposal, Rhode Island will join the majority of 
states that require a hearing court to find a violation by the 
preponderance of the evidence before revoking probation. 
A higher legal burden of proof, especially as it applies to 
violations based on new crimes, lessens the state’s ability to use 
revocation hearings or the threat of revocations as relatively quick 
and easy mechanisms to imprison a person under circumstances 
where it would be difficult or impossible to obtain a conviction.  
The beyond a reasonable doubt standard, though currently used 
by only a few states in revocation hearings, would best safeguard 
against the “proxy trial” problem.76  The adoption of a beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard as to probation violations based on new 
crimes also would alleviate the innocence concerns that Rhode 
 
 73.  COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-206(3) (“[T]he commission of a criminal 
offense must be established beyond a reasonable doubt unless the probationer 
has been convicted thereof in a criminal proceeding.”). 
 74.  Id. (stating that, except for criminal offenses, “the prosecution has 
the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence the violation of 
a condition of probation”). 
 75.  Order Soliciting Comments on Proposed Amendments, supra note 
21, at 1.  
 76.  See supra notes 23–27 and accompanying text.  Of course, imposition 
of a high burden of proof could not altogether eliminate the proxy trial 
problem.  As long as revocation hearings continue to be subject to a relaxed 
version of the rules of evidence and allow the admission of illegally obtained 
evidence, it will remain easier to prosecute via Rule 32(f) than by criminal 
charge.  See Horwitz, supra note 23, at 785. 
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Island General Laws section 12-19-18(b) intended to address.77  
Finally, the beyond a reasonable doubt standard would be easily 
workable, given the judges’ familiarity with applying the standard 
in criminal bench trials. 
On the other hand, some have expressed concern that judges 
would be less willing to offer the benefit of probation at the time of 
the initial sentencing if probation were too difficult to revoke.78  
Furthermore, if probation violations were more difficult to prove, 
prosecutors might also be reluctant to offer a probationary 
sentence as a part of a plea deal.  Of course, defendants’ incentives 
should also be examined when considering the optimal burden of 
proof at violation hearings.  Many defendants may be better 
served by taking a short period of incarceration over a longer 
period of probation and suspended time, because when a 
defendant is on probation, any and every allegation of wrong-
doing—no matter how minor or specious—could expose the 
defendant to the entirety of the longer suspended sentence.79  
Assuming probation is an effective rehabilitation tool,80 an 
 
 77.  See Ellen Liberman, Guilty, Even While Innocent, R.I. MONTHLY 31, 
31–35 (Dec. 2008), available at http://www.rimonthly.com/Rhode-Island-
Monthly/December-2008/Guilty-Even-While-Innocent/.  Section 12-19-18(b) of 
the Rhode Island General Laws, enacted by the General Assembly in 2010, 
provides for an end to imprisonment when a person previously violated on 
probation is not ultimately convicted of the criminal offense that formed the 
basis for the violation.  See John Hill, R.I. Modifies Law on Probationers After 
Four-Year Campaign, PROVIDENCE J., Jun. 20, 2010, at A1.  In 2012, Rhode 
Island Superior Court Justice William E. Carnes held that the statute was 
unconstitutional.  State v. Reis, No. P2-03-2726A, 2012 WL 3638892, at *18 
(R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2012).  Although that particular case has since 
become moot, the Rhode Island Public Defender’s Office appealed that ruling 
in connection with another case that is now pending in the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court. 
 78.  See, e.g., Campbell v. Aderhold, 36 F.2d 366, 367 (N.D. Ga. 1929) 
(“Unless the broad discretion to revoke be fully recognized, much greater 
caution will have to be exercised in extending this grace originally, and the 
benefits of the act will become greatly restricted.”); Piar, supra note 24, at 
128–29 (citing People v. Rodriguez, 795 P.2d 783, 788–89 (Cal. 1990)). 
 79.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-9. 
 80.  While courts often view probationary sentences as a means to ensure 
that a defendant receives needed counseling or treatment in the community, 
it is not the only vehicle by which this goal can be accomplished.  This Article 
omits extensive reference to several alternative sentencing programs existing 
in Rhode Island.  The largest of those programs, the Rhode Island Adult Drug 
Court, has reported a high degree of success in lowering recidivism rates 
among recent offenders; however, given acceptance parameters which limit 
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optimum burden of proof would balance both the state’s interest in 
keeping the community safe and the offender’s interest in his or 
her continued liberty.81 
Most states have concluded that the preponderance of the 
evidence burden provides this happy medium.82  Similar to the 
 
entry to those without drug distribution and other charges, it accepts only a 
fraction of those who could be served by such a program.  NATHANIEL LEPP ET 
AL., COUNCIL ON CRIME PREVENTION, REPORT ON ADULT DRUG COURT: 
ELIGIBILITY, PROCEDURE, AND FUNDING 3, 6–7 (2007), http://www.opendoorsri. 
org/sites/default/files/ccpdrugcourt.pdf.  Programs like the Adult Drug Court, 
which directly minister to illicit drug users accused of crimes, are sorely 
needed: Rhode Island ranks as one of the states with the greatest number of 
individuals needing but not receiving treatment for illicit drug use, the 
second highest percentage of illicit drug abusers in the country, and the 
highest incidence of illicit drug abuse among those who are 18–25 years old.  
Id. at 2–3.   
 81.  The judicial system is not perfect.  In all types of cases, regardless of 
the burden of proof, there will be some decisions or verdicts that reflect the 
factual truth, and there will also be some false positives or false negatives.  
See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Getting it Right: Uncertainty and Error in the 
New Disparate Treatment Paradigm, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1996); see also 
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979).  The particular burden of proof 
employed will determine whether the errors will skew towards false negative 
(here, a finding of no violation when one actually occurred) or false positive (a 
finding of violation when the defendant was innocent).  On the one hand, 
because the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard is difficult to meet, 
convictions should, in theory, skew towards false negatives.  The high 
standard thus prioritizes the interest of the defendant over the community.  
By employing this standard in criminal cases, we have decided that, as a 
society, it is more important that a guilty person go free than an innocent 
person be punished.  On the other hand, in a civil trial where monetary 
awards rather than personal liberties are at stake, a plaintiff is only required 
to prove his or her case by a “preponderance of the evidence.”  E.g., 
Addington, 441 U.S. at 423.  In civil cases, “[t]he risk of error is divided 
equally between plaintiff and defendant because the risk of a false positive is 
equal to that of a false negative.”  Chambers, supra, at 6.  In other words, as 
a society, we have determined that the harm of a truly at-fault plaintiff 
escaping civil liability is nearly equal to the harm of a plaintiff being wrongly 
held financially accountable.  The current burden of proof at a revocation 
hearing, skewed in favor of the state, ensures that false positives will prevail.  
Theoretically speaking, the current standard actually allows more innocent 
probationers to be imprisoned than guilty ones to go free.  
 82.  See sources cited supra note 66.  Preponderance of the evidence was 
also the uniform standard proposed by the American Bar Association in 1970.  
See AM. BAR ASS’N PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 
24, § 5.4(a), at 67 (“[T]he government should have the burden of establishing 
the occurrence of the violation by a preponderance of the evidence in those 
cases where the facts are contested.”). 
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beyond a reasonable doubt standard, it is a workable burden, 
familiar to judges from civil litigation.83  Additionally, unlike the 
burden of reasonable satisfaction in use at the time of this writing, 
preponderance of the evidence is specific, requiring a certain 
quantum of proof: “[P]roof which leads the [factfinder] to find that 
the existence of the contested fact is more probable than its 
nonexistence.”84  Conversely, it appears that even hearing justices 
ascribe different definitions to the term “reasonable satisfaction,” 
leaving the probationer—and his lawyer—with little 
understanding of the quantum of evidence that will satisfy the 
state’s burden at a violation hearing.85  The Superior Court’s 
proposed modification to the legal burden of proof, if adopted, 
would be a welcome recalibration of our probationary system, 
better balancing the public’s safety interest with the probationers’ 
liberty interest.  While it is likely that the state will still meet its 
burden in the majority of cases, more probationers may prevail in 
very weak cases.86  This effect will trickle down to bail decisions 
 
 83.  Some states have concluded that the preponderance of the evidence 
standard should apply precisely because a violation hearing is civil in nature.  
See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 420 N.E.2d 1239, 1241 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).  
Although the Rhode Island Supreme Court has often recited that the hearing 
is a civil proceeding, it has not applied the same rationale to the burden of 
proof.  See, e.g., State v. Gautier, 950 A.2d 400, 408 (R.I. 2008) (“A probation-
violation hearing is a civil proceeding to determine whether a probationer has 
kept the peace and been of good behavior . . . .”). 
 84.  CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK’S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF 
EVIDENCE § 339(a), at 794 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972). 
 85.  The “reasonable satisfaction” burden was described by one hearing 
justice as an “extremely low standard that does not take much to satisfy.”  
State v. Rioux, 708 A.2d 895, 898 (R.I. 1998).  In Rioux, the hearing justice 
revealed just how indefinable the standard really is, quipping that he could 
be “reasonably satisfied by a hot dog on occasion.”  Id.  We recognize that 
other Rhode Island trial justices, troubled by the idea of depriving an 
individual of their liberty on an “extremely low” standard of proof, have 
interpreted the “reasonable satisfaction” burden somewhat more rigorously.  
The difference in interpretation alone demonstrates the malleable and 
amorphous nature of the current standard.  Cf. State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 
270, 278 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (applying preponderance of the evidence 
standard and finding that a “‘some competent evidence standard’ is too 
nebulous to apply to probation revocation”). 
 86.  Georgia provides an example of a state where an increase in the 
burden of proof at violation hearings resulted in an actual change in practice.  
There, the state legislature codified the burden of proof at a violation 
hearing, increasing it from “slight evidence” to a preponderance of the 
evidence in 1988.  1988 Ga. Laws 1911–12, § 1 (codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 
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and negotiated admissions, providing defendants newfound 
leverage in cases with limited or problematic evidence. 
2. Factual Burden of Proof 
Realistically, however, any increase in the burden of proof in 
Rhode Island would be undermined by the revocation hearing’s 
focus on whether the probationer failed to keep the peace and be 
of good behavior.87  In other words, as the legal burden ratchets 
up, violations can nonetheless be found on factual grounds more 
and more distant than those articulated in the criminal complaint 
attached to the Rule 32(f) petition.  Taking Dennis’s case as an 
example, there might not be proof to support, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that Dennis threw the first punch in the bar fight.  
However, the judge may have nonetheless found by a 
preponderance of evidence that he had committed the non-
criminal, but arguably “bad,” behavior of consuming too much 
alcohol that evening or engaging in a heated barroom argument, 
and declare a violation on one of those grounds alone, resulting in 
the imposition of all or part of Dennis’s suspended sentence.88 
 
42-8-34.1(b) (2014)).  Several years later, the Georgia Court of Appeals 
reversed the decision of a trial court that revoked a defendant’s probation 
when there was only “slight evidence” to suggest that the defendant had 
violated probation by being in a home in the presence of narcotics, even 
though this would have been sufficient under Georgia’s previous standard.  
Anderson v. State, 442 S.E.2d 268, 268 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). 
 87.  The Committee Notes for the proposed amendment to Superior Court 
Rule 32(f) explicitly reaffirms the good behavior requirement:  
In addition, the amendment reflects and recites the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court’s settled rule that revocation should not be 
determined by whether the defendant violated any offense which 
may form the basis of the violation allegation; rather, the “‘sole 
purpose of a probation violation hearing is for the trial justice to 
determine whether the conditions of probation’—’keeping the peace 
and remaining on good behavior’—have been violated.’” 
Order Soliciting Comments on Proposed Amendments, supra note 21, at 1 
(quoting State v. Hazard, 68 A.3d 479, 499 (R.I. 2013)).  
 88.  For example, in State v. Lamoureux, the hearing justice declined to 
find whether the probationer had slapped, grabbed, pushed or otherwise 
accosted the complaining witness, or stabbed her brother, and instead based 
his finding of violation on the probationer acting in an “untoward manner 
towards [the complainant] on at least two occasions” and “put[ting] himself 
into unseemly and probably criminal activities within [twenty-four] hours of 
each other,” including participating in a backyard “melee.”  Transcript of 
Bench Decision at 66–67, State v. Lamoureux, No. P1/93-2785A (R.I. Super. 
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As any criminal defense attorney can attest, a major 
deficiency of the “keep the peace and be of good behavior” 
standard is that it fails to provide notice of what, in particular, 
violates this requirement.  Is it associating with other people on 
probation, whether or not you know they are on probation?  Is it 
being in the vicinity of drugs, guns, or stolen property, even if you 
are not aware of your proximity to such items?  Is it being at a 
party where a fight happens to break out?  Is it running from the 
police?  Is it raising your voice in an argument with your spouse?  
Is it using drugs or alcohol?  Indeed, an Assistant Public Defender 
recalled one occasion where the state sought to revoke an 
intellectually disabled client’s probation for using his allowance 
money from his mother for something other than the promised 
purpose. 
In the absence of legislative or judicial reform, the good 
behavior standard is ripe for constitutional attack.89  As the 
United States Supreme Court has made clear, a law is void for 
vagueness if it fails to “give the person of ordinary intelligence a 
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited.”90  Such is the 
 
Ct. Dec. 7, 2011), aff’d, 58 A.3d 189, 193–94 (R.I. 2013).  Moreover, in Rhode 
Island, the state may rely on any allegation of arguably “bad behavior” 
contained within the 32(f) petition when seeking a revocation of probation.  
State v. Znosko, 755 A.2d 832, 835 (R.I. 2000).  This allows the state to rest a 
revocation argument on minute examples of imperfect behavior, further 
discouraging defendants from challenging violation allegations even when 
the majority––or the entirety––of the accompanying criminal claims are false 
or unsupported by the evidence. 
 89.  See, e.g., Fiona Doherty, Obey All Laws and Be Good: Probation and 
the Meaning of Recidivism, 104 GEO. L.J. 291, 303, 305 (2016) (describing the 
lack of constitutional challenges to “be good” conditions as “surprisingly 
rare . . . despite the strong basis for objection,” perhaps because these 
“conditions become embedded in the routine landscape of the law”). 
 90.  Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972); State v. 
Authelet, 385 A.2d 642, 643–44 (R.I. 1978) (stating the due process 
prohibition against vagueness is animated by fairness concerns); see also 
United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A 
probationer . . . has a separate due process right to conditions of supervised 
release that are sufficiently clear to inform him of what conduct will result in 
his being returned to prison.”); United States v. Schave, 186 F.3d 839, 843 
(7th Cir. 1999) (“A condition of supervised release is unconstitutionally vague 
if it would not afford a person of reasonable intelligence with sufficient notice 
as to the conduct prohibited.”); Birzon v. King, 469 F.2d 1241, 1243 (2d Cir. 
1972); Hunter v. State, 883 N.E.2d 1161, 1163 (Ind. 2008) (“Like statutes 
defining penal offenses, the language [of a condition of probation] must be 
such that it describes with clarity and particularity the misconduct that will 
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case with Rhode Island’s factual burden of proof, which, like other 
“good behavior” standards, is “so broad” as to “defy basic due 
process requirements.”91  Nothing in Rhode Island caselaw has 
limited or defined this all-encompassing language, leaving 
probationers and attorneys alike in the dark about the precise 
conduct prohibited.92 
This amorphous standard poses at least two serious risks to 
the fair administration of our probationary system: (1) that “the 
innocent may be trapped by inadequate warning of what the state 
forbids,” and (2) that those who administer the law may 
arbitrarily or discriminatorily enforce the law, perhaps even 
unintentionally.93  Other states avoid these constitutional 
vagueness problems by specifically providing, whether through 
judicial common law or legislation, that probation can only be 
revoked when a probationer violates an explicit condition of 
probation or commits a new crime.  In Indiana, for example, “good 
behavior” has been judicially defined as “lawful conduct.”94  And, 
in North Carolina, recent legislation explicitly limits the grounds 
of revocation to circumstances where the probationer: (1) commits 
a new crime; (2) absconds supervision; or (3) violates a specific 
condition of probation after serving two brief periods of 
“confinement in response to violation” for committing technical 
violations.95  Both frameworks successfully maneuver around the 
 
result in penal consequences.”). 
 91.  Doherty, supra note 89, at 304–05.  Several courts have found 
similar conditions of probation to be unconstitutional.  See, e.g., Dulin v. 
State, 346 N.E.2d 746, 753 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (finding that a condition 
requiring probationer to be of good behavior was “so vague as to be 
unreasonable”); Glenn v. State, 327 S.W. 2d 763, 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 1959) 
(concluding that a condition requiring a probationer to “conduct himself as to 
warrant the confidence and esteem of all law-abiding citizens of this state” 
was “neither definite nor certain as to the conduct required”).  Even narrower 
conditions have been found to be unconstitutionally vague.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 848–49 (7th Cir. 2015) (condition forbidding 
probationer from associating with any persons engaged in criminal activity or 
convicted of a felony was unconstitutionally vague); In re Sheena K., 153 P.3d 
282, 294 (Cal. 2007) (condition forbidding association with anyone 
“disapproved of by probation” was vague and overbroad).   
 92.  See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text. 
 93.  Authelet, 385 A.2d at 643–44. 
 94.  Hoffa v. State, 368 N.E.2d 250, 252 (Ind. 1977) (emphasis added); 
Gee v. State, 454 N.E.2d 1265, 1266 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). 
 95.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1344(a) (2011); State v. Nolen, 743 S.E.2d 729, 
MONTECALVO (RIPD) FINAL EDIT WORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2016  10:41 PM 
344 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 21:316 
constitutional minefields planted by a revocation system based on 
non-criminal “bad” behavior. 
Moreover, the requirement that a probationer must keep the 
peace and be of good behavior may not be desirable as a matter of 
public policy.  Presumably, the primary goal of probation is to 
promote public safety, not to create perfect citizens.  Yet, some 
justices appear to equate “good behavior” with “perfect 
behavior”—an impossible burden for anyone to meet.  For 
example, in one case, a Superior Court judge declared that the 
probationer’s behavior “must be not only lawful, it must be 
impeccable.”96  In another, a judge remarked that a probationer’s 
behavior should be “above reproach.”97  Revoking probation for 
imperfect behavior only increases corrections costs without an 
appreciable improvement to public safety.  The governing factual 
standard in Rhode Island, in other words, is not tailored to the 
overriding goal of probation. 
Finally, requiring perfection sets the probationer up for 
failure, for even the most careful and lawful individual is still only 
human.  As defense attorneys, we recognize this, and are often at 
a loss when advising our clients, telling them to just do their best 
to stay out of trouble, whatever that may be. 
C. Pragmatic Solutions: Changing the Sentencing Paradigm 
The Superior Court’s recommended amendment to its court 
rules provides the justices with the ability to terminate a 
probationary sentence once an individual has successfully 
completed three years of probation and met certain other 
conditions.98  The Superior Court also proposed a new benchmark 
sentence––“Probation Benchmark 37”––that would limit 
probationary terms to three years for non-violent crimes unless 
“substantial and compelling circumstances exist.”99  These 
recommendations target two intertwined problems that have 
bedeviled Rhode Island’s probationary system in recent years: the 
 
730 n.1 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013).   
 96.  State v. Wiggs, 635 A.2d 272, 274 (R.I. 1993). 
 97.  Transcript of Bench Decision at 66, State v. Lamoureux, No. P1/93-
2785A (R.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2011), aff’d, 58 A.3d 189, 193–94 (R.I. 2013).   
 98.  Order Soliciting Comments on Proposed Amendments, supra note 
21, at 1–2. 
 99.  Id. at 4.  
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lack of uniformity in probationary sentencing, and probationary 
periods that far exceed the national average in length. 
Currently, it is customary for the prison sentence, usually 
suspended in whole or in part, to equal the length of probation in 
Rhode Island.100 Unlike most other states and the federal 
system,101 Rhode Island does not cap its probationary terms; 
rather, the length of a probationary sentence is only limited by the 
maximum penalty for the crime charged.102 Most felonies in 
Rhode Island are punishable by up to five years, ten years, twenty 
years, or life in prison.103  For this reason, it is quite common to 
see long probationary sentences tacked on to relatively short 
prison sentences. 
This practice, however, is misguided, for it fails to address the 
separate and distinct purposes of a suspended sentence and 
probation.  The sentence that is handed down after a conviction––
whether suspended or imposed––should represent the appropriate 
punishment for the relevant crime, taking into account the 
severity of the crime, mitigating circumstances, and all other 
factors contained within the sentencing benchmarks.104  When a 
 
 100.  THIRD MEETING, supra note 28, at 49.  
 101.  See ALISON LAWRENCE, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
MAKING SENSE OF SENTENCING: STATE SYSTEMS AND POLICIES 7 (2015), http:// 
www.ncsl.org/documents/cj/sentencing.pdf. 
 102.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-8(b) (2014). 
 103.  See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-5-8, -10, 11-42-4, 31-9-1 (2014) (assault 
of a correctional officer, assault on a person over sixty years of age, threats to 
public officials, driving a vehicle without the consent of the owner are all 
punishable by five years in prison); §§ 11-8-2, 11-41-1, 11-41-2, 11-41-5, 11-
47-8 (breaking and entering into a dwelling house, larceny over $1500, 
receiving stolen goods over $1500, obtaining money under false pretenses 
over $1500, possession of a firearm without a license are all punishable by 
ten years in prison); §§ 11-5-2, 11-4-3, 11-5-1 (felony assault, assault with a 
dangerous weapon, second degree arson, assault with the intent to commit a 
specified felony are all punishable by twenty years in prison); §§ 11-23-2, 11-
37-2, 11-37-8.2, 11-39-1, 11-4-2, 11-8-1 (first-degree murder, second-degree 
murder, first-degree sexual assault, first-degree child molestation, first-
degree robbery, first-degree arson, and burglary are all punishable by life in 
prison).  Some felony sentences fall between these parameters.  For instance, 
a first conviction for drug possession of a drug other than marijuana carries a 
three-year penalty, a second conviction for possession of drugs carries a six-
year penalty, and a third conviction for possession carries a nine-year penalty 
and manslaughter carries a thirty-year sentence.  R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-23-3, 
21-2-8-4.01. 
 104.  Using The Benchmarks, in R.I. R. SUPER. CT. SENTENCING 
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sentencing court, in an act of grace, suspends part, or all, of that 
sentence, it allows the defendant the chance to demonstrate that 
he or she can live safely in the community under prescribed 
conditions.  The amount of time that the probationer should live 
under this supervision should be related to its efficacy.  In other 
words, probationers should be monitored only during the period of 
time when they are likely to reoffend.  In either of the two major 
studies analyzing the data related to rates of recidivism in 
America, a bell curve results: Within the first twelve months, 
recidivism occurs at a high rate for prisoners following their 
release from prison.105  The graph below illustrates that the rate 
of arrests for new crimes or violations of probation decreases after 
a prisoner has been out of prison for twelve months or more—the 





 105.  MATTHEW R. DUROSE, ALEXIA D. COOPER & HOWARD N. SNYDER, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 244205, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS 
RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN 2005: PATTERNS FROM 2005 to 2010, at 1 & fig.1 
(2014) [hereinafter RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS], http://www.bjs.gov/content/ 
pub/pdf/rprts05p0510.pdf. 
 106.  Id.   
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These statistics suggest that once a probationer has 
completed three years of successful probation, it is very unlikely 
that he or she will reoffend, rendering further monitoring 
unnecessary.  Many states recognize this, as twenty-seven other 
states impose a maximum probationary cap of five years or fewer 
in nearly every case107—a far cry from the five, ten, or even 
twenty-year probationary sentences regularly imposed in this 
state as a result of our instinctive bundling of the probationary 
and suspended terms.  However, if the Supreme Court approves 
the rule changes recently recommended by the Superior Court, the 
sentencing landscape in Rhode Island may soon be altered for the 
better.  In particular, by establishing a probation benchmark of 
three years for most felonies108 and permitting the Court to 
terminate probation when certain conditions are met,109 the 
proposals seek to challenge Rhode Island’s reliance on 
disproportionately long probation sentences and provide some 
relief to qualifying individuals. 
In addition to its lengthy probationary sentences, Rhode 
Island also places people on probation at an alarmingly high 
rate—the third-highest in the nation.110  As a result, the 
pervasive problems with the probationary system likely affect over 
twenty-three thousand individuals in this state—one in every 
forty-four Rhode Islanders111—as well as their families.  In the 
capital city, the rate is doubled: One in twenty-one Providence 
residents are currently under probation supervision.112 
Even more troubling is the data showing that the 
probationary system has a disproportionate effect on the minority 
population.  Currently, one in every six black adult males is under 
 
 107.  LAWRENCE, supra note 101, at 7. 
 108.  Order Soliciting Comments on Proposed Amendments, supra note 
21, at 4. 
 109.  Id. at 1–2. 
 110.  ERINN J. HERBERMAN & THOMAS P. BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, NCJ 248029, Probation and Parole in the United States, 2013, at 
16 app. tbl.2 (rev. Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ 
ppus13.pdf. 
 111.  Id.; see also RI PROBATION AND PAROLE OFFENDERS LIVING IN RI 
COMMUNITIES AS OF 12-31-14, supra note 16, at 1, 6. 
 112.  RI PROBATION AND PAROLE OFFENDERS LIVING IN RI COMMUNITIES, 
supra note 16, at 1, 6. 
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community corrections supervision in Rhode Island.113  One in six.  
The Hispanic community fares only slightly better, with one in 
every fourteen adult males on probation.114  Although 
comparatively lower, the percentage of adult, white males on 
probation—one in every thirty-four —is still unacceptably high.115 
1. Earned Compliance Credit Legislation 
As one of the central problems Rhode Island probationers face 
is the sheer length in years of probation,116 other states and the 
federal system may serve as models for a more restrained 
probationary sentencing rubric, one that is better tailored to the 
efficient and effective monitoring of probationers.  Several states 
have experimented with legislation designed to allow probationers 
to earn a reduction in the term (or sometimes the type) of 
community supervision attached to a sentence.117  The logic 
behind such legislation is clear: It offers an incentive to 
probationers to refrain from further criminal activity and comply 
with the rules of community supervision.118  Earned good time 
credit legislation has the added benefit of reducing the cost of 
corrections and lowering the caseload of overburdened probation 
officers.119  The exact calculation of earned compliance credit, or 
earned good time credit, varies by state.  Some states, like 
Missouri, allow for probationers to be fully discharged from their 
 
 113.  RIDOC HISTORICAL OVERVIEW, supra note 6, at 1, 29. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Comparing Bureau of Justice Statistics regarding probationary 
sentences throughout the United States, with data from Rhode Island’s 
Probation Department, the Council of State Governments found that Rhode 
Island felony probation terms were 53% longer than in other states.  COUNCIL 
OF ST. GOV’TS: JUST. CTR., JUSTICE REINVESTMENT WORKING GROUP: FIRST 
MEETING 1, 16 (July 7, 2015), https://csgjusticecenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/ 
2015/07/ RIWG1handout.pdf. 
 117.  See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. CORR. SERVS. § 6-117 (West 2015) (reduces 
or ends active supervision of an individual placed on probation, parole, or 
mandatory release supervision; does not terminate, or end, the legal 
expiration of probation); MO. REV. STAT. § 217.703 (2014) (“[R]educ[ing] the 
term of probation, parole, or conditional release by thirty days for each full 
calendar month of compliance with the terms of supervision.”).   
 118.  See, e.g., Alison Lawrence, Justice Reinvestment in Missouri, NAT’L 
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-
and-criminal-justice/justice-reinvestment-in-missouri.aspx. 
 119.  Id. 
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sentence due to earned compliance credit.120  Other states, like 
Maryland, allow for reduced supervision rather than the full 
termination of the probationary sentence.121 
Missouri’s legislation, “reduce[s] the term of probation, parole, 
or conditional release by thirty days for each full calendar month 
of compliance with the terms of supervision.”122  Under the 
Missouri law, probationers are informed biannually of the time 
remaining on their probationary sentence after their earned 
compliance credit is calculated.123  Probationers may be ordered 
discharged from their sentences as long as they have completed at 
least two years of supervision.124  Certain types of defendants—
those sentenced for violent crimes—are ineligible for earned 
compliance credits.125  Other defendants—sentenced for 
involuntary manslaughter, second degree assaults, and some 
types of sex offenses—are eligible for good time credit but can be 
found ineligible to earn compliance credits upon motion of the 
sentencing court or prosecuting officer.126  There are, of course, 
provisions for those who do not comply with probation rules, as 
well as those who reoffend or violate probation.127 
Rhode Island would benefit by either enacting an earned 
 
 120.  MO. REV. STAT. § 217.703.   
 121.  MD. CODE ANN. CORR. SERVS. § 6-117.  It is worth noting that 
legislative changes to the length of probationary sentences would likely need 
to take into consideration a recent ruling by the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
in Rose v. State, which determined that the original probationary sentence 
handed down by the sentencing judge was inviolable even by Department of 
Corrections good time sentencing regulations pertaining to good time credits 
awarded for prison time. See 92 A.3d 903, 911–912 (R.I. 2014).  Sentencing in 
Rhode Island and elsewhere is a highly choreographed dance between 
branches, with the General Assembly defining the permissible range of 
sentences, the court proclaiming the sentence, and the executive 
implementing the sentence.  See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 
364 (1989) (noting that “[h]istorically, federal sentencing—the function of 
determining the scope and extent of punishment—never has been thought to 
be assigned by the Constitution to the exclusive jurisdiction of any one of 
three branches of Government.”).  It is no wonder, with those competing 
interests, that disputes between the branches about the exact parameters of 
sentencing power arise on occasion.  
 122.  MO. REV. STAT. § 217.703.3.   
 123.  Id. § 217.703.9.  
 124.  Id. § 217.703.7.   
 125.  Id. § 217.703.1(2).   
 126.  Id. § 217.703.2.   
 127.  See id. § 559.036(2)–(3) (Supp. 2014). 
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compliance credit scheme similar to Missouri’s or adopting the 
Superior Court’s proposed amendment to Rule 35 of its Rules of 
Criminal Procedure.  As discussed above, a person should only be 
supervised on probation long enough to demonstrate that he or 
she is able to remain in the community safely.  States that 
terminate probation early or impose a probationary cap—
discussed more fully in the pages that follow—recognize this 
distinction, but Rhode Island courts continue to place men and 
women on probationary periods for long periods of time.  These 
individuals are then subjected to the heightened behavior 
requirements and exposed to the broken revocation process for 
years longer than is necessary to protect public safety.  The over-
prescription of probation comes with a real cost to the tens of 
thousands of men and women who live within the system.  
Probation is not only expensive—an actively monitored 
probationer is subject to an “offender supervision” fee of twenty 
dollars a month128—but it also can require regularly scheduled, 
mandatory appointments with a probation officer.129  For a low-
income probationer with an inflexible employment schedule and/or 
no vehicle, these conditions are particularly burdensome.130 
 
 128.  R.I. DEP’T OF CORR., ADULT PROB. & PAROLE, NOTICE: PROBATION AND 
PAROLE OFFENDER FEES (Mar. 17, 2008), http://sos.ri.gov/documents/archives/ 
regdocs/released/pdf/DOC/5452.pdf. 
 129.  See, e.g., State v. Jones, 942 A.2d 982, 983 (R.I. 2008) (involving a 
defendant faced with a violation hearing “for failure to report to probation 
and to notify his probation officer of a change in address”). 
 130.  While special conditions of probation—such as substance abuse 
counseling, mental health treatment, domestic violence classes, and 
restitution payments—are often well-intentioned, these liberally-prescribed 
requirements often place an unrealistic strain on the budgets of low-income 
probationers.  Failure to comply with these conditions of probation can result 
in serious consequences, evidenced by the fact that over one-third of all 
incarcerated violators have been sentenced on a technical petition, meaning 
that he or she has not complied with one of the general rules of probation, 
such as failing to report to the probation officer, leaving the state without 
permission, or failing to complete a special condition.  See RIDOC HISTORICAL 
OVERVIEW, supra note 6, at 19.  As discussed in Part I, even a short sentence 
on a technical violation can result in the loss of employment or housing, 
which leaves the probationer in far worse financial straits once released from 
prison, therefore making it increasingly difficult to comply with probation’s 
requirements.  Many probationers end up trapped in this vicious cycle as 
short sentences accumulate into years of incarceration, all based on a 
probationer’s inability—for reasons financial or otherwise—to comply with 
the technical demands of probation. 
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2. Placing Limits on Probationary Sentences 
Unlike Rhode Island, most states have placed relatively short 
statutory maximums on the length of probation periods, limiting 
felony supervision (with the exception of sex crimes) to between 
three and ten years.131  According to the National Council of State 
Legislatures, at least eighteen states have limited probation to 
five years in length, and nine states have limits that vary based 
on the offense or the class of offense.132 
Like the twenty-seven other states that cap probationary 
terms, the federal system also employs a relatively restrained 
community supervision sentencing regime where all supervision—
aside from certain sex, drug trafficking, and terrorism cases—is 
capped at five years.133  The federal model offers one example of a 
sentencing system that curtails the length of probationary 
supervision while still respecting public safety concerns and data 
about when probationers tend to reoffend.  Rhode Island imposes 
probationary terms in almost all sentences handed down by the 
District and Superior Courts.134  Like Rhode Island, supervision is 
also imposed in most federal cases but the federal system uses two 
separate terms to describe the supervision: supervised release and 
probation.  Supervised release refers to supervision imposed upon 
defendants after they serve a prison sentence.135  Probation, in 
the federal scheme, constitutes supervision imposed when no 
prison sentence is handed down.136  In both situations, the length 
 
 131.  LAWRENCE, supra note 101, at 7.  Some states require that 
probationary sentences be imposed rather than incarceration for certain 
types of crimes.  For instance, mandatory probationary sentences are 
required in Kansas and Minnesota for some offenders.  Id.  In other states, 
probation is mandated as a sentence for certain crimes, with a narrow 
exception when the defendant is considered unsafe to supervise in the 
community.  Id. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  18 U.S.C. §§ 3561(c), 3583(b) (2012). 
 134.  Probation is included in sentences of straight probation, 
probationary sentences running with suspended prison time, and 
probationary sentences running at the same time, and after, prison terms are 
imposed.  See, e.g., State v. Dantzler, 690 A.2d 338, 339 (R.I. 1997).  As noted 
above, Rhode Island has the third highest rate of people on probation, per 
100,000 residents, in the United States.  See HERBERMAN & BONCZAR, supra 
note 110, at 16 app. tbl.2.  
 135.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a). 
 136.  See id. § 3561.   
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of supervision a sentencing judge may impose is governed by 
sentencing guidelines and federal law.137  No supervised release 
sentence or sentence of probation exceeds five years, except for 
certain sex offenses, drug trafficking, and terrorism offenses.138  
For instance, for class C and class D felonies—which carry 
statutory maximum penalties up to twelve years and up to six 
years, respectively—the term of supervised release imposed must 
be three years or less.139  For class A and B felonies—those which 
carry statutory maximum penalties of life in prison and twenty-
five years, respectively—the supervised release term must be five 
years or less (except for certain types of sex offenses, drug 
trafficking, and terrorism offenses).140 
These limited probationary regimes throughout the fifty 
states and the federal government stand in stark contrast to 
Rhode Island’s lengthy terms of probation.  Practitioners from 
different parts of the state’s criminal justice system have pointed 
out that criminal defendants in Rhode Island often trade shorter 
prison sentences for longer probationary terms, leading to a 
cultural acceptance of long probationary sentences.141  However, 
making changes to the probationary scheme in Rhode Island (such 
as capping the length of probation for certain categories of crimes, 
as recently proposed by the Superior Court) could refocus the 
entire criminal justice community on the true purposes of 
probation.  Judges and attorneys—both prosecution and defense—
might no longer view the imposition of lengthy probationary 
sentences as part of the status quo of the Rhode Island sentence 
 
 137.  See, e.g., id. §§ 3561, 3583.  
 138.  See, e.g., id. § 3583(k) (certain offenses involving minors);  21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(b)(1)(A)–(C) (describing mandatory minimum supervised release 
sentences for drug trafficking offenses); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 5D1.2(b) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014) (allowing up to lifetime 
supervised release for certain terrorism crimes or any sex offense). 
 139.  18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2).  
 140.  Id. § 3583(b)(1). 
 141.  Rhode Island has a relatively low incarceration rate compared to 
other states.  The Bureau of Justice Statistics ranks Rhode Island’s 
incarceration rate in the middle thirty-nine of states in terms of sentenced 
prisoners per 100,000 of population.  See E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2013, NCJ 247282, 7 tbl.6 (rev. Sept. 30, 2014), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p13.pdf.  This means Rhode Island is 
neither among the five lowest states in incarceration rate, nor among the five 
highest states in incarceration rate.  See id. 
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bargaining system; instead, we all might see that our 
unnecessarily long probationary terms are an anomaly in the 
American criminal justice system signifying a deviation from fair 
and efficient sentencing practices. 
In the same vein, the Superior Court’s recent recommendation 
to set a probation benchmark sentence of three years for non-
violent felony offenses142 is a major step forward.  Adopting this 
proposal would lead to increased consistency in probationary 
sentencing, while taking into account public safety and law 
enforcement concerns.  As nearly all re-offenses occur within the 
first three years of a probationary period,143 a probationary 
sentence of ten, fifteen, or even twenty-five years is needlessly 
excessive, punitive, and inefficient.  A three-year cap, on the other 
hand, would conserve resources and allow probation officers more 
time to focus on their higher-risk clients.144  Indeed, imposing 
probationary term limits could be a practical fix to the problem of 
ineffectively long probationary sentences—and one that may be 
fairly simple to accomplish in Rhode Island.145 
 
 142.  Order Soliciting Comments on Proposed Amendments, supra note 
21, at 4. 
 143.  See RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS, supra note 105, at 1 & fig.1. 
 144.  The effect of the Superior Court’s Benchmark 37 will be directly 
proportional to how many people fall within its ambit.  One potential 
weakness of the proposed benchmark is that many felony offenses are 
disqualified from consideration.  For example, the Benchmark 37 does not 
apply to cases where no-contact orders or restitution are imposed, thereby 
excluding most domestic-related offenses, most financial crimes, and many 
theft offenses from the three-year probation cap.  See Order Soliciting 
Comments on Proposed Amendments, supra note 21, at 4.  Rather than 
excluding these types of cases entirely, it might be more efficacious to allow 
the imposition of a no-contact order or a restitution order to be a factor to 
consider when making a departure from the three-year benchmark.  
Similarly, more narrowly defining those offenses excluded from the 
benchmark because they meet the definition of a “crime of violence” would 
broaden the reach of the benchmark and extend its applicability to, for 
instance, some types of felony assaults and breaking and entering offenses 
which are barred in the current proposal. 
 145.   Separation of powers arguments have been implicated in recent 
legislation regarding sentencing.  If the probationary benchmark sentences 
were created by court committee, the benchmarks would necessarily be 
discretionary guidelines rather than mandatory sentencing rules and, as 
such, would not interfere with the General Assembly’s constitutional 
prerogative to define criminal offenses and their punishments and to regulate 
the imposition and execution of sentences, including the parameters for the 
suspension and execution of sentences of imprisonment.  State v. Monteiro, 
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CONCLUSION 
At its best, probation provides certain offenders the 
opportunity to accept responsibility for past wrongdoings in a 
rehabilitative environment, where they can be monitored and 
counseled as they seek employment, support their families, and 
attempt to distance themselves from their criminal 
past.  However, as discussed in this Article, Rhode Island’s 
probationary system has failed to function as intended, resulting 
in the costly incarceration of too many of its residents.  Too often, 
otherwise productive citizens collapse under inordinately long 
sentences that are imposed in a one-sided violation scheme, while 
others, like Dennis, end up with life-long criminal records due to 
minor mistakes.  Like the eponymous sailor in Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge’s The Rime of the Ancient Mariner, these probationers 
are unable to free themselves from the weight of their past 
transgressions until long after they have suffered unnecessarily. 
Unlike the doomed mariner, however, there is hope for the 
probationers of Rhode Island.  We are encouraged by the interest 
in reform that has been expressed in the wake of the Mass 
Incarceration Symposium, and as public defenders, we look 
forward to collaborating with the various stakeholders working to 
create a fair and efficient offender rehabilitation system, which 
would benefit all Rhode Islanders. 
 
 
924 A.2d 784, 793 (R.I. 2007); State v. Tucker, 747 A.2d 451, 454–55 (R.I. 
2000). 
